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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

KING BROS., INC., a corporation,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (
-vsUTAH DRY KILN COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.

I

Case No. 10931

BRIE,F OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District
Court, after a trial on the evidence, of no cause of action in
favor of the Defendant and Respondent. The action was by
a claimed materialman (and assignee of another materialman) to recover in a direct proceeding against a contracting
party, not an owner of any interest in the land upon which
the construction was developed, for the furnishing of material to a dry kiln in Panguitch, Garfield County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court entered judgment for the Defendant
and against the Plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant and Respondent urg.es affirmance of the
trial court's decision.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
.
Because the transcribed reporter's notes are numbered
mdependently from the other portions of the record ref .
· be: "(T ............ ) " Other refer.ences
' er
ences t o t es t"imony will
to the record will be: "(R .......... ) ". Appellant is referred
to as the "Plaintiff" and Respondent as the "Defendant".
Defendant, Utah Dry Kiln, is a corporation organh~ed
in 1939 or 1940 (T. 47) primarily to cure, market and ship
lumber (T. 48). It kilned (cured) and sold lumber acquired
from Crofts-Pearson Industries and J. E. Crofts and Sons,
two separate partnerships (T. 52) but purchased lumber
from other sources (T. 48, 127). In 1959 Defendant entered
into a contract with an Oregon corporation known as "Oregon Dryer Company" to build a dry kiln at Panguitch (T. 7
and 10).

It is significant that Oregon Dryer Company's repre-

sentative had been in Utah "endeavoring to sell his equipment" ( T. 29). Pursuant to these efforts Utah Dry Kiln
was invited to Oregon to inspect this kilning equipment
where the Manager, Dwain Pearson, was shown such, if not
the same, equipment as was later shipped to Panguitch for
the kiln development. (T. 29). Mr. Pearson was later flown
"south" to see "identical" equipment installed and in operation (T. 29, 30).
Of the total contract price of $24,000.00, the Defendant
paid to Oregon Dryer Company approximately 50% (T. 69)
which substantially exceeded the proportionate part of the
total contract which Or,egon Dryer completed (T. 36, 37).
In addition, Oregon Dryer Company left the job requiring
Defendant to rebuild the equipment, install it, and to furn·
ish an expensive but essential conveyor, expending much
mo~e tha~ the contract price in doing the work themselves
(T. 36-41) and sustaining over $20,000.00 in actual, indepen·
dent damages by Oregon Dryer's defaults (T. 42-47) ·
While there is no evidence whatsoever in the record
that any purchases made by Oregon Dryer Company .fro!ll
the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's assignor, Mead and Associates.
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were in any way incidental to the Panguitch job, the Plaintiff claims that either it or its assignor are materialmen to
the kiln project entitled to sue Defendant as an owner of
land enhanced by the value of equipment Oregon Dryer
Company may have purchased from Plaintiff and its assignor.
The Defendant did not ,ever and does not now own any
interest in the land on which the contract was to be performed (T. 48, 49, 122, 139, 142).
The Trial Court, on undisputed evidence, found that:
(Finding No. 4. R. 58) * * * the land upon which
construction of the dry kiln was commenced w a s
owned by ,either Crofts-Pearson Industries, a partnership, or J. E. Crofts and Sons, a partnership;
that said partnerships are respectively the owners
of two adjacent tracts of land in Garfield County
near the town of Panguitch and the dry kiln constructed near the boundary common to those two
tracts; however, the evidence does not establish on
which or upon whose tract of land, as between the
partnerships Crofts-Pearson Industries and J. E.
Crofts and Sons, the construction work was developed.
5. The Court finds that the Defendant did not own
any interest in either tract of land or the land on
which the dry kiln was constructed and did not have
either a written or verbal authorization or any permiRsion of the partners in either Crofts-Pearson I~d
ustries or J. E. Crofts and Sons to construct the kiln
upon the site on which the work was prosecuted.
However the kiln was built upon said land without
objection.
6. The Court finds that the owners of the land re.ceived no benefit from installation of the kiln upon
their property but that the Def;endant, Utah Dry
Kiln Company, Inc., had no interest in the 1 and
either in fee or under any leasehold estate but held,
if anything, only a license at suffe~ence of the true
owners, having been permitted to go upon the land
without objection by the owners thereof.
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The only relationship Defendant might have with th
land is what may be characterized as a license terminable a~
the will of the owners. T h e owner of the land was not
established but it may be either J. E. Crofts and Sons
which is a separate partnership consisting of a man (J. E'.
Crofts) who is neither associated with Crofts-Pearson Industries nor with Utah Dry Kiln and his sons, (T. 113) or
Crofts-P·earson Industries which in 1959 was a sawmilling
partnership but since 1963 has been a corporation (T. 130).
Although the Plaintiff did not establish whether J.E.
Crofts and Sons or Crofts-Pearson Industries owned the
land on which the kiln was constructed, it is clear that one
of the two owned the land as their r.espective boundaries
were common and may have "overlapp.ed" (T. 116). None
of the partners of J. E. Crofts and Sons was ever consulted
about use of the land (T. 139).
WhHe the Defendant, Utah Dry Kiln, cured and marketed lumber for CPI and J. E. Crofts and Sons, they purchased lumber for kilning and resale from other sources (T.
48, 127). There was no benefit to the owner of the land that
Utah Dry Kiln be allowed to locate on the premises (T. 132,
133, 146). The Court so found, (R. 58, Finding No. 6) and
it was uncontroverted.
If Utah Dry Kiln were required to surrender occupancy
of the premises, the owner of the land undoubtedly could
remov.e it but the property Plaintiff sues on could be remov·
ed without damage either to it or to the land (T. 130) ·

The Plaintiff raises for the first time on appeal the
argument that the principle of alter ego should be invoked
here. It is neither pleaded nor proved.
M ore conclusively prohibiting application of th~ t
theory, the Plaintiff did not prove on whose land the ki~~
was built (T. 113, 116, 128) so it is not know_ n a\~othe
against whom Plaintiff seeks to apply the doctrine. . ..
s which 1~.
property w e r e owned by J. E. Cro ft s an d on~,
most probable, then we have a partnership owmng store,.
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agricultural land and separate lumber interests, in existence
for 40 years, some but not all of whos.e partners own some
but less than a majority of the stock in Utah Dry Kiln,
(T. 126, 136, 140) but have no other relationship to Defendant (T. 142, 143).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT C 0 R R E C T L Y APPLIED THE
STATUTE (SECTION 14-2-1)
A. AN INTRINSIC ELEMENT OF A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 14-2-1 IS OWNERSHIP BY
THE DEFENDANT OF AN INTEREST IN LAND:Jii
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT NOR D 0 ES NOT NOW
OWN ANY INTEREST IN ANY LAND.
POINT II.
THE MATERIAL OF PLAINTIFF AND ITS ASSIGNOR
WAS NOT "FURNISHED UNDER THE CONTRACT".

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL C 0 U R T CORRECTLY APPLIED THE
STATUTE (SECTION 14.-2-1)
A. AN INTRINSIC ELEMENT OF A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 14-2-1 IS OWNERSHIP
BY THE DEFENDANT OF AN INTEREST IN
LAN~

B. DEFENDANT DID NOT NOR D 0 E S NOT NOW
OWN ANY INTEREST IN ANY LAND
To justify application of this statute the Utah Supreme
Court in Liberty Coal & Lumber Co. vs. Snow, 53 U 298, 178
P341 (1919) Deasoned that:

*Harries v. Valgards on, et. al.
_u2d
, _PZd_
Case No. 10829. Decided
September 25, 1967
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The purpose of t~e statu_te is to I?revent the owners
of Ian~ from havmg their lands improved with the
m~tenals and labor furnished a n d performed by
third pei::sons, and thu_s to enhance the value of such
lands, without becoming personally responsible for
the reasonable v a 1 u ·e of the materials and labor
which enhances the value of those lands.
The evolution of Section 14-2-1 galvanizes the legislature's intention to make ownership of land an essential element of liability. The first enactment (Ch. 91, L. 1915)
stated:
Any pers01~ V.'ho ma!-::es a contract * * * (provid'ng
substantially as the statute now reads) * * *
"Any person," as used herein, refers to the owner of
the land, or of any interest therein, whether acting
directly with, or through any other person authorized by, or acting with the knowledge and consent of
such owner.
The underscored text was eliminated by the 1933 revision of the Code. 1
This section's history, inherently influential in its in·
terpretation, 2 expresses an intention to eliminate acquies.cence by the owner as sufficient basis for a cause of action.
The omission of a provision in an amended statute is pre·
sumed to be intentional. 3
As r.evised, the statute provides simply that to become
liable the contracting party, provided the agreement ex·
ceeds $500.00, must own an intevest in the land.
In order to predicate an action upon a liability or .en·
force a new remedy created or given by a statute and unknown to the common law, one must bring himself strictly
within the operation of the statute. Vol. 1, Am. Jur. 2d
Page 602, Actions, Sec. 73.

2

:;

· ·
B k an 88 U 424•
Sec. 17-2-1 Rev. Stat. 19:;:1. See State Tax Co!"mrnswn vs. ac m •
55 P2d 171, distinguishing revision from comp1lat10n.
50 Am. Jur 276, Statutes Sec. 295.
50 Am. Jur 262, Statute' Sec. 275.
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This same text continues:
in creating a right of action which did not
exist at common law, the statute fixes the conditions
upon which the right may be asserted these conditions are an integral part of the right granted and
are substantive conditions, the observance of which
is essential to the assertion and benefit of the liability itself. * * * An action created by statute can
be maintained only for the benefit of the persons
specified in the statute and against such persons as
are contemplated by the statute.
W~ere

The statute in question should be strictly construed on
the ground that it is "penal" in nature. Bulk sales acts, having- the cognate effect of requiring a person in default to
pay twice, once to the seller and once to the seller's creditors
if he does not comply with the statute, have been held to be
"penal", in derogation of the common law, and to be strictly
construed. United States vs. Goldblatt Bros., CAA Ill., 128
F2d 576, 579; Zenith Radio Corp. vs. Mateer, 35 N. E. 2d
815, 816; 311 Ill. App. 263. And the Mechanics Ven Statute
providing for double liability of the lienor in improper declaration of liens was termed "penal" comm:md ng· a sfr;{'.t
construction in Collins vs. Peckham Road Corp. 236 NYS2d
415, 418; 18 AD2d 860.
The cas.e annotated and some of the cases collected in
the note at 55 ALR2d 877 conclude that statutes similar to
the one in question are, largely on the ground that they are
characterized as penal, to be strictly construed.
No statute - penal or remedial - should be construed
any more broadly or given any greater effect than its terms
require. Where a statute is clear in limiting its application
to a particular class of cases there is no authority to transcend or add to the statute or .extend it to related cas.es not
falling within its exp res s provisions. 50 Am. Jur. 215,
Statutes, Sec. 229.
In this action the Defendant corporation, engaged for
25 years in the business of servicing an d selling lum~er,
entered into an agreement to establish a kiln proj·ect which
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ultimately arose on land owned by one of its two princip I
suppliers of lumber (T. 7, 10, 47, 48, 52, 127). The reco:d
does not disclose on whose property the proj,ect was developed. (T. 116); but the evidence is undisputed that if the
owner were ,ever to protest, then Utah Dry Kiln not only
must (T. 123) but, without any damage to the kiln, the
equipment subject of this action, or the land, also could
(T. 130) move everything.
There was no benefit or advantag,e to the land owner
(whoever it may be) in having the kiln on its property. An
offi0er of each of the possible owners of the land, Crofts.
Pearson Industries (T. 132, 133) or J. E. Crofts and Sons
(T. 146), so testified.
The reason why Utah Dry Kiln followed its principalbut not exclusive (T. 48, 127) - trade suppliers to this location is best illustrated by the testimony of an officer of
Utah Dry Kiln that:
We will have to take the risk (of being evicted) for
the ad v a n t a g e that we had in placing it there
(T. 123) (supplied)
B. DEFENDANT DID NOT NOR D 0 E S NOT NOW
OWN ANY INTEREST IN ANY LAND
It is horn-book law that a license is not an inter.est in

the land 4
There are no minutes or writings of J. E. Crofts and
Sons (T. 142) or of Crofts-Pearson Industri-es (T. 48, 49)
creating any interest that would survive the Statute ~f
Frauds 5 or which would create any interest of any sort in
Utah Dry Kiln. There was never any verbal representation
or declaration of a lease or other property interest to Utah
Dry Kiln (T. 50, 141, 142)
4

3·> A

a~ a

Jur '198

1!1· * *

Licenses

Sec. 91:

"A 1·
.
I
rty may be defined
1cense in rea prope
.

p~iviiege to do' one or more acts on land ~it~out pos~~ssing an

interest therein. Indeed the distingui.shing ch~racter1st1cs. of a h{ense
are that it gives no interest in land and that it may rest in paro ·
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Sec. 25-5-3 UCA, 1953
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A bare license does not constitute a contract or grant
any title or interest in the property.6
The Plaintiff seems to argue in its brief for application
of the doctrine of alter ego or disregard of the corporate
identity of Utah Dry Kiln. This was neither pleaded nor
proved.
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Shaw vs. BaileyMcCune, 11 U2d 93, 355 P2d, 321 this Court held application
of that doctrine to be particularly within the province of the
Trial Court a n d in disregarding the entity courts should
exercise great caution. The doctrine is to be applied only
in cases of fraud, contravention of law or statute, or a public
wrong.

A corporate entity may not be disregarded simply because it stands as a bar to a litigant's 11ecovery. 18 Am.
Jur2d, 562 Corporations, S.ection 14.
Schenley Distillers Corp. vs. United States, 326 U. S.
432, 90 L. Ed. 181, 66 S. Ct. 247, holds that even wher.e those
in control of the corporation deliberately adopt the corporate form to secure its advantages (certainly not the case
here), the corporate entity still will not he disregarded.
In the case before the Court, Utah Dry Kiln was incorporated and in business long before any of the other business organizations who own the land in question were conceived (T. 48).
This theory, which Plaintiff seems to be raising for the
first time in this appeal, is wholly without merit.
POINT II.
THE MATERIAL OF PLAINTIFF AND ITS ASSIGNOR
WAS NOT "FURNISHED UNDER THE CONTRACT"
Section 14-2-2, UCA, 1953, states that persons within
the purview of Section 1 of that chapter shall be personally
3:J CJS 810, Licenses Sec. 84
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liable to all persons who have furnished materials "u d
the contract". The 1966 Idaho case of Layrite Product~ er
Lux, 416 P2d 501, is strikingly similar, applying a statL~ts~
substantially identical to 14-2-2.
In that case the contractor and claimed materialman
(the. latter being the Plaintiff) were both Washington corporations and the Defendant was an Idaho resident constructing a home.
Layrite Products sold materials to the contractor in
various transactions throughout the immediate past.
Layrite contended the materials sold and later used in
the Defendant's home werie sold "with reference to" the
particular job.
The Idaho Supreme Court held, 416 Pacific at 504:
Statutes such as the Idaho provision which permit a
lien for materials furnished * * * do not include the
furnishing for general or unknown purposes or an
ordinary sal,e in the usual course of trade or upon a
general open account or a sale without any reference
as to what shall be done with the material sold. It
has been held that * * * it is not essential that at the
time the materials are sold the parties have in con·
templation any particular building or structure. The
weight of authority, however, holds that it is .essen·
tial that the materials shall have been sold or furn·
ished for the specific purpose of being in the parhc·
ular building on which the lien is claimed. Adell·
tionally, the materials must have been furn:shed on
the credit of the building and not merely on the gen·
eral and personal credit of the owner, contractor, or
some other person.
Th e foregoing precisely fits the fact situation here
(T. 29, 30).

It is a part of the Plaintiff's burden to prove that the
property was "furnished under the contract". 36 Am. Jur.

1st 62, Liens, Sec. 75.
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So far as the record shows the sale was ,entirely completed in Or,egon and the equipment came to Utah as the
property of Oregon Dryer Company with respect to whom
Plaintiff and its assignor are only general c11editors.
The record is devoid of any proof that the materials
were furnished under the contract. In fact the Plaintiff's
complaint alleges that the ,equipment was the subject of an
unqualified sale to Oregon Dryer Company in October of
1959 (Complaint Para. 2, R. 1).
There was a proposal by the Plaintiff (T. 64) that the
Court find the material was furnished under the contract
but the Court rejected this motion (T. 65).
The evidence is entirely to the contrary; Utah Dry Kiln
went to Oregon and saw Oregon Dryer Company fabricating
or working upon kiln equipment such as that used at Panguitch (T. 29, 30). The Oregon Dryer Company r epresentative declared that they would be "responsible for the equipment" (T. 12). The relationship of general creditor only
existed between the two Oregon corporations.
1

CONCLUSION
We respectfully conclude that the Plaintiff did not, and
could not, establish t h e statutory elements of a cause of
action under Section 14-2-1 because the Defendant was not
an owner of land and the record is totally silent with r,espect
to any evidence that the equipment was furnished under the
contract.
Respectfully submitted,

OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent

